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ABSTRACT
This research represents one segment of a joint study
sponsored by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's
Center for Real Estate Development and the National
Association of Realtors. The purpose of this research was to
analyze foreign investment in U.S. real estate in three major
markets: Chicago, Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. Our
thesis focuses on the Los Angeles market.
The central question of our research was, "How are foreign
investors in U.S. real estate different from domestic
investors?" We found the following: for the last two years
the Japanese have been the most active foreign investors in
Los Angeles' central business district, almost to the
complete exclusion of all other nationalities; they prefer
well located, high quality, fully leased "signature"
properties; low capitalization rates are mostly a thing of
the past; large Japanese real estate companies are moving
beyond simply investing and are beginning to develop property
in the U.S.; they pay cash for the properties they acquire;
they avoid speculative investments and generally intend to
hold properties for a long time; they are most comfortable
conducting business with people and firms with whom they have
a long-standing relationship; they are only beginning to
explore the use of syndications and convertible debt
instruments; distinctions between foreign and domestic
investors will become more obscure in the future.
We conclude that foreign investment in U.S. real estate is
not a fad but a long term trend that will lead to the
internationalization of real estate markets.
Thesis Supervisor: James McKellar
Title: Director
Center for Real Estate Development
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INTRODUCTION
Little is known about how foreign investors make
decisions and what they look for in a property. Given
differences in language and culture, many Americans assume
that foreign investors and their domestic counterparts are
fundamentally dissimilar, and that therefore dealing with
foreigners must be different than dealing with U.S.
institutions. Our report examines this perception.
The specific questions we asked were: 1) Are foreign
investors in U.S. real estate really different than domestic
investors? and 2) If they are different, in what ways? These
questions were examined through a research of current
literature and our formulation of brief profiles which
examined selected foreign investors, as well as their recent
acquisitions in the U.S. These profiles looked at the
parties involved and how they came together; the structure of
the transations; the nature and terms of the financing used;
the role of outside professionals and advisors; and the goals
and concerns of the buyers, as well as the buyers' methods of
doing business. Our methodology included extensive
interviews with principals involved in the acquisition of
U.S. properties, and with other real estate professionals
and intermediaries.
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Because a study of the entire U.S. was beyond the scope
of this report, we focused solely on the Los Angeles market.
Note, however, that this paper is one part of a larger study
which is specifically examining foreign investment in three
U.S. cities: Chicago, Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. It
is expected that our findings will be combined with those
from the other two cities and incorporated in a broader
report.
Our study was further focused on downtown Los Angeles
because that is where almost all the important transactions
by large foreign institutional investors have occurred. In
addition, although all foreign real estate investment was
eligible for this study, we discovered that since 1985 the
Japanese had become, by far, the most active foreign
investors in this market, almost to the complete exclusion of
any other nationality. As a result, much of our report
addresses the Japanese situation specifically, rather than
foreign investors generally. We believe this is appropriate
in light of the overwhelming predominance of the Japanese in
Los Angeles, which we expect to continue for the foreseeable
future.
This report presents an overview of the economic factors
which have made U.S. real estate such an attractive target
for Japanese institutional investors (Chapter I) and why Los
Angeles in particular has received such a disproportionate
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share of their investment (Chapter II). Next, brief profiles
take a closer look at a cross section of five different
foreign investors and their specific investments and
situations in Los Angeles (Chapter III). We then examine
what is different about foreign investors (Chapter IV), and
identify anticipated future trends (Chapter V).
6
CHAPTER I
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
"I LOVE AMERICA"
Title of cover page, Faces of Shuwa
informational brochure of Shuwa Corporation
Foreign interests have been major purchasers of U.S.
real estate since the late 1970's. According to The Survey
of Current Business (1), between 1977 and 1984, 057 billion
was directly invested in the U.S. (See Exhibit 1-1.) The
major foreign investors and each one's percentage of total
investment over this period included the United Kingdom
(19%), Canada (17%), the Netherlands (15%), West Germany
(6%), OPEC countries (5%) and Japan (3%). The remaining 34%
was distributed among the rest of the world.
Within this timeframe, individual countries experienced
radical shifts in their investment strategies. (See Exhibit
1-2.) For example, Canada and the Netherlands, buoyed by oil
profits, recorded their highest level of investment activity
in 1980. Coincidentally, oil consuming nations such as West
Germany and the United Kingdom (prior to viable extraction of
oil from the North Sea) recorded sharply lower activity in
1980. OPEC investment levels in U.S. property declined
precipitiously throughout the period as oil profits were
devoted to internal capital improvements.
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Since this data was compiled, the Japanese have become
the leading foreign investors in U.S. property and, as
discussed throughout this paper, the major foreign presence
in the Los Angeles real estate market.
In 1984, the Japanese purchased $663 million of U.S.
real estate. According to a report prepared by Salomon
Brothers (2), in 1985 this figure increased to $1.5 billion
and by 1986 swelled three times that level to $4.5 billion.
Projections by the Real Estate Research Corporation estimate
Japanese investment in U.S. real estate for 1987 at just
under 06 billion.
There are a variety of reasons that explain Japanese
interest in U.S. real estate.
Limited Opportunities in Home Martkets
The Japanese commercial real estate market is land-
supply constrained. Containing 146,000 square miles, Japan
is roughly the size of California, yet it holds 120 million
people, or half the U.S. population. Approximately 85% of
the land is either reserved for farming or is too mountainous
for development. Competition for the remaining land is
therefore intense, particularly within Tokyo's central
business district.
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Due to its scarcity, land rarely sells. For example,
the largest owner of real estate in Japan, Mitsubishi Estate,
owns over 24 million square feet of office space and is said
to have never sold a major property in its fifty year
history. In those rare instances when a corporation does
sell real property, it is widely perceived as an indication
of financial difficulty.
The acute demand for land has caused prices to increase
dramatically. For example, in October, 1985, a tiny plot of
2900 square feet of land in Tokyo's central business district
sold for 061.5 million or $21,000 per square foot. The value
of real estate in Tokyo jumped 54% in 1986 alone (3). Hajime
Tsuboi, President of Mitsui Real Estate Development Company,
Ltd., predicted in the company's 1986 annual report that "The
increase in Tokyo land prices will slow over the next couple
of years, but prices will not fall."
Efforts are underway, in fact, to contain Tokyo's
skyrocketing real estate prices. In mid-July, 1987, the
Japan Federation of Bankers and the Association of Trust
Banks directed their members to stop issuing loans for
speculative real estate ventures.
Land prices are now so high in Japan that they typically
comprise up to 80% of a project's development cost. Such
land costs have diminished returns on commercial real estate
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investments to the 1% to 4% range. Comparable annual returns
for U.S. property range from 6% to 9%. For a host of
reasons, similarly low rates of return on commercial
properties are also the rule in the home countries of the
other primary foreign investors in U.S. real estate (4).
Another reason for Japanese landowners to hold property
for the long-term is an onerous capital gains tax. In Japan
if a company sells land it has owned for less than ten years,
any gain is subject to a 20% capital gains tax, in addition
to the regular 42% corporate income tax.
Strong cultural and financial disincentives to sell real
property limit opportunities at home and have made U.S.
investments more attractive. According to an executive of
Nomura Real Estate International, Inc., "Due to market
constraints, we can't do the kind of real estate business
that we want in Japan. We expect to do most of our future
business in the United States" (5).
In addition, a variety of macro-economic and political
pressures have transpired to encourage Japanese investment
here.
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Increased Value of the Yen and Trade Balance
Japan's balance of trade with the United States reached
record levels in 1986, 086 billion versus $46 billion in 1985
(6). Japanese firms have acquired more cash than can be
reasonably utilized in their domestic economy. The
increasing hostility of the U.S. government over the trade
imbalance has, among other things, caused Japan's Ministry of
Finance ("MOF") to liberalize regulations regarding foreign
investment by Japanese firms. The MOF hopes that increased
Japanese investment in the United States will help defuse the
protectionist impulses of the U.S. Congress.
While all foreign investment is subject to review by the
MOF, in most cases such review is cursory. By early 1986,
only fiduciaries, such as insurance companies, trust banks
and pension funds were subject to stringent MOF review. The
MOF initially permited 10 percent of the assets of these
fiduciaries to be invested in foreign securities, including
real estate. Since then, the limit for insurance companies
has been raised to 25% of assets. A similar increase for
trust banks is expected soon.
Investment approval for fiduciaries is granted after an
exhaustive MOF analysis of a proposed transaction. The MOF
seeks assurances that a project is viable, that risks are
minimized and that the level of return is accurately
12
projected. This is a time-consuming process and can take up
to three months, depending on a transaction's size and
familiarity.
Another factor that has made U.S. real estate
investments attractive is the precipitous rise in the value
of the yen versus the dollar. Between June, 1985, and
December, 1986, the yen appreciated 45% against the dollar,
from 249 to 137. As a result, U.S. property has become
relatively inexpensive for the Japanese buyer, particularly
when compared to the prices in Japan for similar property. A
senior officer of Nomura Real Estate International, Inc.,
cited this as the "prime reason for (his) company's presence
in the United States".
Strength of the yen relative to the dollar is not
expected to affect continued Japanese investment in the U.S.
because returns here will remain above comparable returns
found in Japan. If the dollar strengthens against the yen,
Japanese investors who purchased U.S. property when the
dollar was weak, will realize a currency gain and will have
hedged some of the acquisition/development risk. Although
their compatriates who bought U.S. property when the dollar
was stronger have realized a currency exchange loss, another
dramatic fall by the dollar does not appear likely at this
time.
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A final economic factor favoring Japanese investors is
the availability of cheap institutional capital. For a
variety of reasons, Japanese banks have a huge amount of
money to lend. The Japanese people have possibly the highest
personal savings rate in the world. They save approximately
22% of disposable income while the United States savings rate
is on the order of 2% to 4% (7). Further, Japanese banks are
allowed to retain lower capital reserves than comparable U.S.
institutions. In addition, the value of hidden reserves held
by these banks, i.e. the difference between the book value
and market value of common stock and real estate holdings,
has increased dramatically due to rises in stock prices and
the value of real estate in Tokyo. This has swelled the
capital ratio of Japanese banks to 8% to 10%, approximately
50% stronger than U.S. banks. Because of this value and
their negligible loan loss ratios, Japanese banks have the
highest credit ratings in the world.
In addition, Japanese companies have more than adequate
assets to collateralize major loans. Due to the dramatic
appreciation of Japanese land, the value of real estate owned
by Japanese businesses is far in excess of its original cost
(book value), sometimes exponentially so. Because accounting
principles do not permit this tremendous increase in value to
appear on a company's balance sheet, the term "hidden assets"
has arisen to describe the situation.
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In Japan, banks do not make non-recourse loans, even
when the borrower uses the funds to purchase real estate.
The loan is made on the basis of a company's overall credit
worthiness and ability to repay. The banks, of course, are
fully aware of the borrower's "hidden assets" and are
therefore willing to lend large sums based on this value.
In 1986, such funds could be borrowed in Japanese yen at
an annual interest rate of about 3%. If this money had been
invested in U.S. real estate, however, the borrower would
have been exposed to currency fluctuations. To avoid this
exposure, Japanese firms often borrowed in U.S. dollars and
paid an interest rate of approximately 7%. (It is unclear
why Japanese banks would lend dollars to a Japanese company
at 7% when it could invest those same dollars in U.S.
government securities and receive a return of 8% or higher.
This would be an interesting topic for future research.)
The practical result of these factors is that Japanese
banks lend funds at lower rates, providing Japanese real
estate investors with leverage to pay more for a property
and/or accept a lower rate of return than other investors.
Other Factors
There are several other factors that make the U.S.
particularly attractive to the Japanese, as well as any other
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foreign investor. First, the U.S. has one of the most stable
political and economic environments in the world. Its free
enterprise system has few barriers to entry and is considered
to be among the safest capital havens. The United States has
a relatively unblemished record regarding confiscation of
property and discriminatory taxation. In addition, the
American people are generally perceived as being indifferent,
if not receptive, to foreign investment.
The United States provides a much larger market than
found in most foreign countries. This creates an opportunity
for diversification by property type and location. A senior
executive of Ohbayashi America Corporation, stated "we could
have 100 projects underway in the States if we want, while it
is difficult to find any reasonable opportunities in Japan"
(8). As indicated, the scarcity of land and its high cost
have diminished development opportunities there.
Also, the United States provides foreign investors with
a laboratory to learn and experiment with heretofore
unavailable investment vehicles. Mitsui Real Estate
Development Company, Inc. cites this as one of their primary
reasons for investing here. Among the sophisticated
financing techniques that the Japanese are familiarizing
themselves with are real estate investment trusts (REITs),
joint ventures, syndications and convertible mortgages. U.S.
investors are well versed in these techniques and find the
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Japanese willing students.
Some recent examples include Japanese institutional
purchase of approximately 0550 million of the 01.3 billion
REIT used to sell Rockefeller Center in New York City. In
another case, Haseko, the U.S. subsidiary of Hasegawa Komuten
Company, Ltd., brought a 060 million public syndication to
market in Japan that included two office buildings, one at
Los Angeles Airport and another in downtown Tokyo. Haseko's
representative indicated that it was the first attempt by a
Japanese firm to package properties from two different
countries in the same investment.
Finally, the U.S. tax code also offers incentives to
foreign investors in real property. Depreciation schedules
are much more generous here than other countries. For
example, commercial property in Japan is depreciated over a
65 year period while a 31.5 year period is used here,
recently increased from 19 years. Further, tax rates are
lower here than in most industrialized countries. A recent
Wall Street Journal survey found the following corporate tax
rates: U.S. 34%, England 35%, Switzerland 36%, Netherlands
42%, Japan 43%, France 45%, Canada 46%, Australia 49%, Sweden
52% and West Germany 56%.
The Tax Reform Act ("TRA") of 1986 helped stimulate
foreign interest in U.S. real estate by essentially repealing
17
the 1980 Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act
("FIRPTA"). FIRPTA and its amendments had imposed taxes on
foreign sellers of U.S. property and a bevy of reporting and
withholding requirements. Further, most of the tax shelter
advantages available to U.S. investors were also removed by
the TRA. Domestic real estate syndicators were particularly
hard hit by the strong disincentives for tax driven deals
contained in the new law. Syndicators were among the primary
competitors to foreign investors because of their willingness
to pay top dollar for property. The Japanese investor's view
of the new playing field was summarized by an officer of
Shuwa Investment Company, who said that "The changes in the
tax code got the amateurs out of the business". (9)
The Tax Reform Act also motivated many Americans who
owned property to sell their holdings before the end of 1986.
The repeal of favorable capital gains tax rates and the new
passive loss restrictions, both beginning in 1987, were
factors that compelled such sales. Thus, two key
ingredients, the willingness to sell and the value of the
yen, both peaked towards the end of 1986, creating an
irresistable buyer's environment for the Japanese.
For the above reasons, the United States real estate
market is uniquely attractive to foreign investors,
particularily the Japanese. Most initial Japanese investment
activity in the U.S. has been concentrated in Los Angeles,
18
the gateway city to the Pacific Rim. According to a Morgan
Stanley estimate, as much as 35 percent of Japanese real
estate investment activity to date has been made in
California, mostly in the Los Angeles area. (See Exhibit
1-3.) The features of the Los Angeles market that attracted
Japanese investment are described in the next chapter.
EXHIBIT 1-3
Japanese Investment in U.S. Real Estate
(By Location of investment)
New York (25.O)
Hawaii (15.0%)
Texas (5.0%)
Other Cities (15.0%)
Source: Morgan Stanley
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California (35.0%)
CHAPTER II
OVERVIEW of LOS ANGELES and its REAL ESTATE MARKET
Business and Financial Center of the West Coast
The Los Angeles region is typically defined as a sixty
mile circle including all of Los Angeles and Orange counties
and most of Riverside, San Bernadino and Ventura counties.
This area covers only five percent of the State of
California, yet it dominates the state's economy.
Within the past decade, Los Angeles became the
headquarters for half of California's largest savings and
loan institutions, four of the five top insurance firms and
seven of the top ten financial holding companies. Growth
within the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate ("FIRE")
sectors is expected to continue for the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, the Los Angeles area contains the second
largest concentration of business, population, employment,
and finance activity in the United States today. Only the
greater New York area boasts more economic activity. Exhibit
2-1 displays a comparative analysis of economic growth
patterns among major U.S. financial centers.
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The Greater New York regional economy is the largest in
the United States. However, the growth rate for population,
personal income and employment in the Los Angeles region
between 1975 and 1985 easily outdistanced New York City,
Chicago and the nation as a whole (10). Population gain
within the region was 14 times greater than New York's and
seven times greater than Chicago's. Total personal income
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jumped 175% between 1974 and 1984, far exceeding the
increases of New York (+137%) and Chicago (+121%). Further,
of these three areas, Los Angeles is the only one to record a
gain in manufacturing employment, while the other two lost 6%
and 21% of their manufacturing employment base, respectively.
Nonagricultural employment grew at four times the rate of New
York's and 14 times the rate of Chicago's during the ten
years ended 1985.
According to data compiled by Salomon Brothers (11), the
Los Angeles region has a current population of 12.8 million
people and 5.6 million non-argricultural jobs, demonstrating
continued growth since 1985. This market also features an
elaborate transportation network consisting of five major
airports, two large ports, more than fifteen railway
companies and an extensive system of freeways. Furthermore,
three new public transit projects are now in the planning or
construction stage.
In addition to the above, there are several other
factors that help attract the Japanese to Los Angeles. For
one, this market is already home to a significant number of
foreign companies. According to a March, 1987, report
prepared by the California Department of Commerce (12),
California has the second greatest concentration of total
foreign investment activity in the U.S. and the highest
annual growth rate of foreign investment for any State, 31%.
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As of 1984, the last year for which data is available, the
total value of foreign investment in California property,
plant and equipment was $31.3 billion. Los Angeles County
captured 25% of this investment, the highest amount of any
county in the state.
Furthermore, California has attracted the highest
percentage of overall Japanese investment in the United
States, 25%. According to a May, 1987, study by the Los
Angeles-based Japan Business Association of Southern
California (13), there are more than 500 Japanese companies
located in Southern California which directly employ some
64,600 persons. Compared to a similar study conducted in
1983, employment levels have increased 58% and the number of
firms has increased 28% in the intervening period. These
Japanese firms represent a diversified range of industries:
real estate, manufacturing, financial services, construction
and trade.
Los Angeles also features a diverse economy that is not
heavily dependent on any one industry. In fact, the five
largest nonagricultural industries employ only 36% of the
workforce. (See Exhibit 2-2.) These industries are office
employment, wholesale trade, research and development,
electronic media and apparel.
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The high tech, apparel and manufacturing industries have
demonstrated economic strength. For example, the Los Angeles
area houses the largest concentration of high tech industries
in the United States, easily surpassing the Route 128 area of
Boston and Silicon Valley near San Jose. Supporting this
industry is the country's largest concentration of
scientists, mathematicians, engineers and skilled technicians
and the third largest concentration of colleges and
universities, numbering 150, in the U.S.
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A further example of the dynamic nature of the Los
Angeles economy is its apparel industry. According to
Salomon Brothers, U.S. employment in the garment industry
declined by 19% over the 1972 to 1986 period, yet it
increased by 36% in the Los Angeles area (14).
Another characteristic of this area is its
attractiveness to immigrants. Los Angeles is home to one of
the country's largest undocumented immigrant populations.
The large pool of both legal and illegal workers enables the
area's manufacturing and apparel industries to pay below
average wages, which makes their products more price
competitive. According to Salomon Brothers, manufacturing
wages in Los Angeles during 1970 to 1980 increased 15% more
slowly than the rest of the country (15). This situation
partially explains the city's relative strength in light of a
nationwide reduction in manufacturing employment.
Immigration has made Los Angeles one of this country's
most prominent "melting pots". Approximately one and a half
million new residents migrated to California between 1980 and
1985 (16). In the the City of Los Angeles, according to
Census Bureau data, 49% of the population is Hispanic and 12%
Asian (17). While more recent data than 1980 is not
available, today the proportion of Asian residents is
believed to be closer to 20%. The composition of the Asian
25
population has also undergone substantial changes.
Historically comprised of Japanese and Chinese immigrants,
the city has recently attracted substantial migration from
such other Pacific Rim countries as Korea, Thailand and
Vietnam. In fact, according to Frank Jansen, Vice President
in Chicago Title's Los Angeles office, by 1986 this area
contained "the largest Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Phillipine,
and Viet Namese populations in the world outside of those
home countries."
Due to its economic and cultural ties with Pacific Rim
countries, Los Angeles has evolved into the leading port on
the West coast. San Francisco, its nearest competitor, ships
and receives 60% fewer goods than Los Angeles, based on gross
tonnage (18). Furthermore, as shown in Exhibit 2-3, the
aggregate value of import and export activity in the Los
Angeles area is second only to that of New York. However,
international trade in the Los Angeles area grew at a far
greater rate (+193%) than the New York did (+45%) during the
period from 1975 to 1985.
Based on this high level of economic activity, domestic
and foreign banks are gravitating to Los Angeles, as well as
other financial institutions, law firms and professional
service companies. For example, 173 non-California banks,
including 126 from foreign countries, have opened offices in
Los Angeles. Most of the domestic banks have done so in
26
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anticipation of banking deregulation. The number of these
out-of-state firms is up substantially from 1980 when only 69
foreign banks and 45 domestic non-California banks were
located in Los Angeles (19). Financial institutions'
exuberance for Los Angeles was best expressed by Walter C.
Butcher, Chase Manhatten's Chairman and chief executive
officer who said,
"Los Angeles is the principle business center
for the entire Pacific Basin. It is an
extremely important market. In fact, if
interstate banking had been in existence three
decades ago, Chase would have beaten Walter
O'Malley and the Brooklyn Dodgers into the
27
city." (20)
Re-location and expansion of these businesses is expected to
lead demand for office space in the city through the end of
the decade.
While the electronic media's share of the workforce is
only two percent, the value of that industry to the region's
economy far outweighs that figure. The TV and motion picture
industry provides an on-going advertisement to the world of
Southern California's attractiveness and thereby kindles
interest in this market from tourists, immigrants and
investors.
Lastly, the State of California recently modified its
unitary tax law. The change limits taxation to only include
a firm's California operations and does not tax its worldwide
profits. This amendment was widely supported in the foreign
business community.
In summary, Los Angeles is blessed by enormous business,
population, trade and employment growth and this dynamic
economy will continue to expand for the foreseeable future.
It is a gateway for Japanese goods into the U.S. and is home
to a large concentration of businesses from that country. It
should be no surprise, therefore, that the Japanese have
concentrated so much investment activity in this area. An
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overview of the greater Los Angeles market follows.
The Los Angeles Real Estate Market
The Los Angeles real estate market is the sixth largest
in the U.S. with more than 108 million square feet of office
space. Inventory grew by 39 million square feet between 1970
and 1980, and by another 47 million square feet since then.
The greater Los Angeles real estate market is comprised
of several significant sub-markets: Downtown, Westside, San
Fernando, West Central, South Bay, Glendale/Pasadena, Long
Beach/Mid Cities and San Gabriel. Exhibit 2-4 describes
current and projected size and market conditions of each of
these sub-markets. A map of the Greater Los Angeles market
is found at Exhibit 2-5.
Of all submarkets, the Westside has emerged as the most
prestigious alternative to downtown for office space users.
Currently, the Westaide has the lowest vacancy levels in the
Los Angeles market. Even though it is projected to have the
highest absorption rate in the region, its vacancy rate will
not decline greatly due to record construction activity.
Similar levels of construction activity coupled with slower
than expected absorption will dramatically increase vacancy
rates in Pasadena and South Bay. These two areas have
attracted the most speculative office development activity in
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29.2 Msf
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10.3
7.4
23.9
108.5 Msf
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3.8 msf 13.0%
3.4 15.7
3, 3 20,6
2.6 25.2
1.3 17.6
3.5 14.6
17.9 Msf 16.5 %
ESTIMATED
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IN 2 YEARS
5. 4 Msf
3
2.2
2.4
0
15.2 'Msf
ABSORDTIDN
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1987-88a
1.9 fsf
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1.1
6.2 Xsf
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18. 1
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16.7%
CLASS "A" RENTS
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$25-$32 $22-$30
22-24 15-18
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19-22 16-18
18-20 12-14
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a - Annua6l Average
E - Sal.oon Bros. Inc. estimate
P - Salozon Bros. Inc. project ion
Msf - Millirs of square feet
Source: Salomon Brothers Inc., Report on the Los Angeles Real Estate Market, January 1987, p.12.
the region. Areas such as the San Fernando Valley and the
Mid-Wilshire district should improve as construction activity
drops below absorption levels throughout the remainder of the
decade.
In spite of all of the activity in the suburban market,
the focus of this analysis is on the Downtown's Central
Business District ("CBD"). We concentrate on this market for
several reasons. For one, it is the most prestigious site of
development activity in the region and is therefore the focus
of most foreign investment. It is also the target address
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for most East Coast and Asian financial and legal concerns
that are seeking to establish a West Coast base. This is
evidenced by names such as Citicorp, Chase and Dai-Ichi
Kangyo Bank which are found atop an increasing number of
Downtown buildings. In addition, over the next decade, the
CBD will become the hub of the new subway and light rail
system.
Finally, real estate development in the CBD is less
constrained than the sub-markets. Spurred by such groups as
the "Not Yet NY Coalition" who decried the "Manhattanization
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of L.A.", local residents recently voted to limit development
in most of the sub-markets by a two to one margin. Dubbed
"Proposition U", the measure reduced by 50% the amount of
floor space allowed in future commercial buildings. Only the
Downtown, parts of Hollywood and a few other established
business districts were exempted from its provisions. Thus
Downtown will become increasingly important as developers
will have fewer alternatives in the future.
Market Characteristics
The Downtown area covers 2.5 square miles and is
bordered by the Harbor Freeway on the west, the Hollywood
Freeway on the north, the Santa Monica Freeway on the south
and Broadway on the east. Fortune 500 companies, law firms
and financial services companies are the major tenants in
this market.
The CBD has a total of approximately 23.5 million square
feet of office space, of which 10.8 million square feet was
constructed between 1982 and today. (See Exhibit 2-6.) This
explosion in office construction has had profound effects on
vacancy, absorption and rental rates. Absorption rates have
lagged construction completions throughout the post-1982
period causing vacancy rates to soar from 3% in 1982 to 17%
in the first quarter of 1986. (See Exhibit 2-7.)
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With construction significantly outpacing absorption,
overbuilding resulted in a tenants' market. Lease
concessions typically included six months free rent for each
five year lease commitment, tenant improvement allowances
ranging up to $35 per square foot and liberal renewal and
expansion clauses.
33
6
4
.5
2
2
EXKBI E-7
4.5
4.0
35
25
20O
1.5
1 0
0.5
00
Construction v. Absorption
1970 to 1986
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988E 1990E 1992E
Year
D Absorption + Construction
1970 to 1986
30%-
28%-
26%-
24%-
223.
20%
18%
16%-
14%
12
10%-
8%-
6%-
4%-
2%
0%- I I I
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Year
Source: Jones Lar; Woonttcr
34
C
0
0~(n
K
V
0
- --------- - ------ - --------------- - ------
Nonetheless, demand for office space has grown
significantly throughout the 1980's, reflecting the strength
of the local economy. Occupancy rates should increase
through the end of 1988 as only two new buildings are slated
for completion - the 225,000 square foot Home Savings Bank
building and the 625,000 square foot Trans-Pacific Center.
Vacancies will fall as supply and demand come more into
balance. Reduced construction activity has allowed the
vacancy rate to ease from a high of 17% in 1986 to 15% by
mid-year 1987. This trend is expected to continue, barring
any retrenchment in the economy. Jones Lang Wootton and
Coldwell Banker project a 1988 CBD vacancy rate of 7% to 8%
while Salomon Brothers takes a more conservative position at
13.4%. Regardless, the short-term development prognosis
appears favorable.
The dearth of construction in the CBD has opened up
certain niches in the market. For example, property owners
and brokers are having a difficult time meeting tenant demand
for 40,000 or more square feet of contiguous space. However,
these opportunities will be short-lived, as construction is
expected to resume at its frantic mid-1980's pace through the
remainder of this decade.
After 1988, approximately 4.8 million square feet of
additional class A office construction is planned for
completion through 1991. (See Exhibit 2-8.) Since plans for
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many of these projects have not been finalized, it is
difficult to project their impact on absorption, rent and
vacancy rates. However, unless demand picks up, the
projected 1.1 million square foot absorption rate will lag
construction completions, increasing the vacancy level to
double digits once again.
In looking to the future of downtown office development
there are at least four constraints to continued growth of
this market: inadequate and expensive parking, traffic
congestion, high land costs and the threat of a slow growth
environment which might envelope the CBD as well. Failure to
mitigate these constraints could cause investors and tenants
to seek space in more hospitable suburban locations.
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In the following chapter, we describe the extent of
foreign ownership in Los Angeles and look at a cross-section
of prominent foreign investors.
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CHAPTER III
PROFILES OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN LOS ANGELES
"The Japanese Land Rush in America"
Lead story, Real Estate section, Los Angeles Times,
Sunday, February 1, 1987
Foreign investment in Los Angeles real estate,
especially by the Japanese, is no secret. At present foreign
interests own over 12 million square feet of office space in
the downtown's central business district, where most foreign
investment is concentrated. This amounts to more than half
of the total office space available there. (See Exhibit
4-1.)
Of course, the total amount of space in the CBD is a
matter of opinion, to some degree, and depends on a number of
factors. These include the following: where the boundary
line for the CBD is drawn; whether or not a given building on
the fringe is included in the total; whether or not the
quoted square footage for a building is the net rentable
amount and whether it includes retail space; etc. Thus,
certain parties may disagree with some of the figures used in
Exhibit 4-1. The important point, however, is not whether
51.6% is the exact amount of foreign ownership. Rather, it
is to simply demonstrate that a very significant portion of
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accuired a 50% interest
the CBD is foreign owned.
Exhibit 4-1 also shows the purchase price for 13 of the
31 buildings identified as owned by foreigners. Just these
13 buildings cost more than $1.7 billion. Thus, even with
limited information, it is obvious that huge sums of money
have been invested in the CBD by foreigners.
The degree of foreign ownership in Los Angeles also
seems somewhat overwhelming because the downtown CBD is
rather small for a city of this size. As was discussed in
Chapter II, Los Angeles has several major markets which total
about 108 million square feet of office space, but of this,
the downtown accounts for less than 22%. Because foreign
investment has been concentrated in the CBD, it has become a
big "fish" in the relatively small downtown "pond".
Therefore, its preponderance may, in fact, be somewhat
exaggerated.
Of course, every foreign investor in the Los Angeles
market starts off new at some point. All have to learn about
the local economy and business practices, to establish their
own network of contacts and information, and to assess this
real estate market and the level of competition. For many
firms, the initial project will be something which they
consider somewhat safe and conservative, in order to "get
their feet wet." As each company becomes more comfortable and
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experienced, and progresses along its own learning curve, it
may expand the scope of its activities or pick a niche where
it feels it can be most effective.
Some foreign firms, like life insurance companies, may
never expand their activities beyond the acquisition of
existing first class office buildings. Others definitely
expect to develop new properties in the future. A growth
path which some firms are pursuing consists of the following
four basic steps: 1) acquire a partial ownership interest in
an existing building; 2) acquire full ownership by itself of
an existing building; 3) form a joint venture with an
experienced domestic developer to develop property; and 4)
develop property on its own. Not all companies follow this
path and some may skip certain steps, but it serves as a
useful way to gauge where a given company is on its learning
curve.
The remainder of this chapter contains brief profiles of
five foreign companies that own property in downtown Los
Angeles. The purpose is to provide the reader with some feel
for the different players in this market and where each one
is on its learning curve, as well as to illustrate the size
and type of projects that are involved. The discussion is in
alphabetical order and includes one British and four Japanese
companies.
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Hammerson Property (West U.S.A.) Corporation (21)
Hammerson Property Investment and Development
Corporation PLC has assets in excess of $2.5 billion.
Founded in England in 1931, Hammerson first began to make
international real estate investments in the early 1960's.
Today it owns, with its subsidiaries, more than 14 million
square feet of office buildings, shopping centers and other
commercial properties in the United Kingdom, France, West
Germany, Holland, Canada, the United States, Australia and
New Zealand.
Unlike many domestic developers, Hammerson is not
interested in, or motivated by, the tax benefits available
for real estate investments. Also, it prefers to own its
projects 100% and therefore does not consider joint ventures.
Although, like many foreign investors, Hammerson generally
intends to hold its properties for a long period of time, it
will nonetheless sell a building if the growth prospects no
longer appear promising.
Hammerson Property, the U.S. subsidiary, seeks a return
of 10% or more on its investments. However, in Los Angeles a
return this high is not available on existing first class
properties due to strong competition, especially from
Japanese investors. Therefore, the company concentrates on
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under-performing properties where it can use its development
expertise to create additional value in order to achieve the
higher return it needs. Furthermore, it is currently
involved only in office projects, as its staff lacks the
experience needed to compete against shopping center
specialists.
Before any investment can be made, final approval must
be obtained from the company's Executive Director in London.
Obviously this slows down the decision-making process.
However, it has not caused Hammerson to miss out on any deals
because the projects it is pursuing, primarily rehabs, are in
a less competitive niche in the market.
The Los Angeles office was first opened in 1982 and
today is completely staffed by Americans. Its initial
project was the acquisition in 1984 of a 12 story, 370,000
square foot building at 818 West 7th Street. This property
met the firm's requirement of being well located within
downtown's central business district and Hammerson liked its
potential. After paying about 057 million in cash to
purchase the structure and buy out existing leases, Hammerson
then undertook a complete renovation of the building, which
was originally constructed in 1924. Renovations were
complete in early 1986 and today the building is about 90%
occupied.
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Its next project began with the acquisition of an
existing ten story office building at 655 South Hope Street.
Hammerson then built an additional seven floors on top of the
original ten, and added a new exterior to the entire
structure. With an average floorplate of 7,400 square feet,
the smallest in the CBD, this building was targeted for
mid-size financial and professional tenants. Leasing has
been somewhat disappointing, with only about half of the
space currently occupied. However, this project again
demonstrates Hammerson's willingness to take on development
and leasing risks in exchange for potentially higher returns.
In addition, because one of the stations in the CBD for the
new subway system will be located in the basement of this
building, leasing is expected to improve in the longer run.
Hammerson does not perform the leasing or management for
its Los Angeles properties itself because its portfolio is
not big enough to support such activities. It does, however,
want to expand its portfolio, and like many foreign
investors, it has the ability to pay cash.
At the present time, Hammerson can finance major
acquisitions in the U.S. very inexpensively through the sale
of additional capital stock. A Hammerson official indicated
that in London the stock of real estate companies usually
sells at a discount of roughly 20% from its asset value.
However, Hammerson's stock is currently selling at about 100%
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of asset value. Considering its annual dividend rate of
2.5%, Hammerson can raise a substantial amount of cash with a
yearly expense far less than the 8% to 10% it would cost to
borrow such funds. This factor, coupled with a favorable
currency exchange rate for pounds sterling, is providing
Hammerson with the opportunity to achieve a significant
presence in the U.S. real estate market in a short period of
time.
Mitsui Fudosan (U.S.A.). Inc.(22)
With book-value assets of almost $6.5 billion, Mitsui
Real Estate Development Co. is one of the largest real estate
firms in Japan. Its most famous project is probably Tokyo
Disneyland, but it also develops office buildings, hotels,
shopping centers, health clubs and about 5,000 residential
units per year in its home country.
Mitsui's experience with U.S. real estate started in the
early 1970's when its U.S. subsidiary, Mitsui Fudosan,
became the financial partner with Cabot, Cabot & Forbes in
the development of large industrial parks in Seattle, WA and
Carlsbad, CA. However, Mitsui owns 70 office buildings in
Japan and so it was only a matter of time before it became
involved in U.S. office properties as well. In 1979, wanting
to establish itself in the Los Angeles market, Mitsui bought
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an existing building, the 42 story AT&T Center at 611 West
6th Street for S79 million.
The purpose of this initial acquisition was to enable
Mitsui to get a feel for the Los Angeles market and how
business was done there. They learned how to negotiate for a
large office building and how to negotiate with existing and
prospective tenants. However, according to a senior official
of the firm, this building was purchased with "a Japanese
mentality" regarding leasing. In Japan, the term of a lease
for office space is typically two years, but with Tokyo's
very low vacancy rate, tenants almost always renew the lease.
In the U.S., of course, lease terms of five, ten and even 15
years are not unusual. Furthermore, tenants often move when
a lease expires, as Mitsui discovered: Shortly after its
purchase, two large tenants moved out, and this 715,000
square foot building became more than 35% vacant. "If we had
known that leasing was so volatile we would have bought a
smaller building." (Today, the building is again fully
leased.)
Like many of the large Japanese firms, Mitsui is
inundated with information on properties and deals available
to them. These investment opportunities are brought to the
company by a plethora of investment bankers, banks, national,
regional and local real estate brokers, and other contacts
within the business community. Mitsui has formed no special
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relationship with any of these parties, but rather keeps them"
all at an equal distance. Mitsui has been in the rea. estate
business for over 300 years. It is, therefore, interested in
determining which of these firms it will be comfortable doing
business with for many years to come, not Just which firm ha::
the best deal this week.
Any investment decisions must be approved by the
Executive Committee in Tokyo. This, of course, limits the
speed with which the company can move and it ability to react
to special opportunities. Like most large, publicly-held
companies, Mitsui is concerned about maintaining and
increasing corporate profits every year and is not interested
in a one-time gain. Criteria such as an internal rate of
return or a cash on cash return, which are standard methods
used by Americans to evaluate investments, are not relevant
to an investment decision by Mitsui.
When the company does decide to make an investment,
money is not a problem. Based on its strong record of
success and the value of its "hidden assets", Mitsui has an
almost unlimited line of credit with Japanese banks. It will
usually borrow funds in the local currency in order to limit
its exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. Although it owns
properties in France, Hong Kong and other countries, 90% of
its investment outside Japan is in the U.S.
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Mitsui has acquired a number of existing properties, but
its main goal in the U.S. is to be a developer. To this end,
several years ago it bought three vacant parcels in Los
Angeles' CBD. One of these, at 1000 Wilshire Blvd., was sold
to a domestic developer, Reliance Corp., who built a 452,000
square foot office building on it which was then sold to
Sumitomo Life. The second site, at the Northeast corner of
8th and Figueroa Streets, is currently used as a parking lot
and there are no plans to develop it in the immediate future.
The final parcel, at the corner of Wilshire Blvd. and
Figueroa St., is almost universally considered the best
location in the city. After sitting on this jewel for
several years, and after some well publicized false starts,
Mitsui will break ground on this site in January, 1988, to
begin construction of a 52 story, 1,000,000 square foot
office building, currently called Mitsui Tower.
As this will be its first development of an office
building in the U.S., Mitsui recognized the need for
assistance from an experienced domestic developer. Gerald D.
Hines Interests, of Houston, was selected to provide the
needed expertise based on its professionalism and its track
record of developing major high rise office buildings in
downtown locations throughout the U.S. Hines will oversee
the design, marketing and approval processes of this $200
million project and will manage the building upon its
50
completion. However, Hines is working on a fee basis only
and will not receive an ownership interest in the property.
One noteworthy aspect of this development is that Mitsui
is going ahead with construction despite a current vacancy
rate of about 15% in the CBD, and without having any tenants
committed to occupy space in the building. Obviously, a U.S.
developer would need substantial preleasing commitments from
tenants in order to obtain its construction and permanent
financing. Mitsui can proceed, however, because its loans
from Japanese banks are general obligations of the
corporation, and are not secured solely by the property. A
domestic developer's borrowings, on the other hand, are
almost always non-recourse and secured only by the property.
Mitsui's decision to proceed with construction is
indicative of its confidence in the Los Angeles office
market. However, the company expects to complete its current
project with Hines and then probably develop the other site
mentioned above before it considers any further investment in
the CBD.
Although most other foreign investors in the Los Angeles
area hire a domestic company to manage their U.S.
properties, Mitsui manages its own properties through a
subsidiary, Aspen Property Management. In addition, it does
not have a long term view toward all the property it acquires
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or develops. It considers industrial parks to be short term
investments which will be sold after a few years. However,
Mitsui does intend to hold onto its office buildings for a
very long time.
Nomura Real Estate International, Inc.(23)
In July, 1986, Nomura Real Estate Development Co.
purchased a 50% interest in Manulife Plaza, at 515 S.
Figueroa St., for approximately $60 million in cash. This
high-rise building contains 393,000 square feet of rentable
office space, and had been developed by Manufacturers Life
Insurance Co. ("Manulife") of Canada only four years
earlier. At the time of Nomura's purchase the building was
fully occupied, and many of the leases were for more than 10
years.
These factors were very important to Nomura. Their only
previous investment in U.S. real estate occurred in 1983 when
they bought the California First Bank building, which is also
in downtown Los Angeles (630 W. 6th St.). Nomura paid $20
million for this 110,000 square foot structure that, at the
date of acquisition, was about 27 years old. This initial
investment proved disappointing because, as Nomura
discovered, the building had elevator and structural problems
which were very expensive to repair.
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As a result of this experience, Nomura resolved to buy
only office buildings that were recently constructed.
According to a senior official in Los Angeles, "Professional
fees are very expensive when there are problems in a
building." Therefore Nomura feels it must buy the best
building possible, "even though the price is very high." Its
criteria for evaluating properties now are: location, credit-
worthiness of tenants, and the age and condition of the
building ("the newer, the better").
Nomura found out about the opportunity for the above two
investments from contacts within the Japanese banking
community. However, they are now also kept informed by
numerous American brokers and other real estate
professionals. A officer of the firm stressed that Nomura
needs to "establish a strong relationship with a trustworthy
American company," because with so many markets it is
difficult to know them all and to find the best buildings.
In Los Angeles, when a promising building is identified,
Nomura's local staff will inspect the asset and then send all
information, along with a recommendation, to headquarters in
Tokyo. If, after analyzing the information package, Tokyo
wants to continue, a supervisor from headquarters will come
to the U.S. to look at the property. However, even if the
supervisor agrees, approval from the Board of Directors is
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still required. As a result, it takes at least two to three
months to reach a final decision to purchase a building.
Nomura feels that most of its competition for buying
U.S. properties comes from other Japanese companies, and it
is concerned about the possible distortion of the market that
can result from greatly overpaying, as some Japanese firms
have supposedly done. Nomura uses a target capitalization
rate of 8% for its acquisitions. In some cases it may be
willing to wait a year or two to achieve this return, but
even in the first year of ownership returns should be no less
than 6%.
Nomura's Manulife Plaza investment had a cap rate of 8%,
which was guaranteed by Manulife for the first few years.
Nomura is paying interest of 7% on the funds it borrowed from
its Japanese lenders to make this investment. Therefore, it
is earning net income (pre-tax) of 1% on its $60 million
investment, all of which was borrowed.
Nomura plans to continue to invest in the Los Angeles
real estate market and hopes to become active in other
markets in the U.S. as well. It recognizes that to do so it
must increase its manpower in the U.S., and Nomura wants to
accomplish this by hiring American real estate professionals
onto its staff. It also plans to open a New York City office
within the next few years.
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Ohbayashi America Corporation(24)
Ohbayashi Corporation is one of the largest general
contractors in Japan and has been involved in major
construction projects all over the world. For its fiscal
year 1986, revenues exceeded $4.2 billion and it owned assets
with a book value of almost $5.4 billion. Its U.S. projects
include the Toyota Motor Corporation's factory in Georgetown,
Kentucky and the Sheraton Kauai Hotel in Hawaii, which it
owns.
Despite its size and experience, however, Ohbayashi has
found the American construction industry somewhat difficult
to enter. Its Los Angeles subsidiary, Ohbayashi America
Corp., has therefore decided to create its own construction
opportunities by engaging in joint ventures with local
developers. For these ventures Ohbayashi will typically
provide very attractive financing for the project and will
always serve as the general contractor.
Negotiations with developers are conducted at the local
level, but Tokyo provides constant feedback and must approve
any final agreement. As part of this process, the company
must satisfy itself as to the feasibility of the project, the
reliability and experience of the developer, and Ohbayashi's
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own capacity to do the work within the required time frame.
Due to the distance, language barrier and unfamiliarity with
each other, a partnership agreement may take from three to 18
months to be finalized.
The financial criteria considered for such projects
typically include cash on cash return for the first three
years and sensitivity analyses. Cap rates are usually
greater than 10%, but in some cases may be as low as 8%. One
thing that differentiates them from institutional investors
is that Ohbayashi expects to sell the property within ten
years. This is because in order to generate new construction
opportunities, it needs to rollover its old projects. In
addition, its U.S. partners are usually small firms who also
want to sell.
Finding good American partners is difficult because,
although they are usually very creative, they are not always
good in administrative areas. As a large company, Ohbayashi
needs certain written reports on a regular basis which it
often does not receive. Also, keeping projects within budget
has been difficult, due to the long approval process. If a
project is successful, however, Ohbayashi would work with
that partner again.
An official of the company indicated that Ohbayashi is
currently involved with many different types of projects and
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that it considers this to be a time of experimentation, in
order to determine which project types are most suitable for
them. Of course, office buildings and hotel projects are
easier for those in Tokyo to understand, and are therefore
more likely to be approved, but that has not been the
exclusive result.
For example, Ohbayashi's first joint venture in Los
Angeles was a 220,000 square foot project which included a
supermarket, a retail shopping mall and a 40-lane bowling
alley, along with an adjacent 700 car garage. Known as
Little Tokyo Square, this project is in the downtown's Little
Tokyo section and was finished in June of 1986 at a cost of
approximately $35 million. Next, in March, 1987, the company
completed a $17 million hotel containing 174 rooms, also in
Little Tokyo. Current projects include an 80,000 square
foot, $12 million office building in Pasadena and a 204 unit
retirement center in Canyon Hills budgeted at $23 million.
Shuwa Investments Corporation(25)
The largest real estate transaction in Southern
California's history took place in September, 1986 when Shuwa
Corporation purchased the Atlantic Richfield ("Arco") Plaza
for $620 million. This property consisted of twin 52-story
towers, totaling 2.2 million rentable square feet of office
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space, and 200,000 square feet of below-ground retail space.
The Bank of America was the main tenant in one tower (555 S.
Flower St.), while Arco occupied much of the other tower (515
S. Flower St.) as its world headquarters.
The $620 million purchase price for Arco Plaza was paid
in cash. Shuwa had obtained the funds by borrowing $62
million from each of ten Japanese banks. Although a lower
interest rate could have been obtained if Shuwa had borrowed
these funds as Japanese yen, it decided to accept the higher
interest rate (about 7%) and instead borrowed in the form of
U.S. dollars, in order to avoid any exchange rate risk.
The owner of Arco Plaza was Flower Street Limited
Partnership, which was owned 48% each by ARCO and Bank of
America, with the remaining 4% interest held by a third
party. The partnership hired two investment banking firms,
Eastdil Realty Inc. and First Boston Corporation, to market
the property and represent the sellers. The investment
bankers prepared brochures and made presentations which
generated interest from several investors.
Despite an occupancy level near 100% and a prime
location in the middle of Los Angeles' central business
district, this was not an easy property to sell. Its sheer
size limited the number of candidates who could even consider
it. Futhermore, the buildings contained asbestos which had
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to be removed. Many prospective buyers decided they did not
want this additional cost and the exposure to unknown
potential liabilites which accompanied it.
Shuwa had seen the presentation on Arco plaza some
months earlier, but did not really become interested until
July of 1986. However, it then outbid Canadian giant Olympia
& York and eight other firms by paying $30 million more than
the next highest bid to acquire the property. The sale was
announced on August 4 and closed on September 17, 1986.
Other than the size of this transaction, a
representative of Arco who was involved in the sale felt its
most unusual aspect was Shuwa's speed. Shuwa evaluated the
property, including the physical inspection and a review of
the financial records, very quickly and actually closed
within two months after initial negotiations began. In
addition, he felt that Shuwa was easier to deal with than
many American landlords regarding certain lease terms for the
space which the Bank of America and Arco would continue to
occupy. For example, Shuwa was less picky about the language
relating to options, rights to change their own space,
subleasing and improvements in public areas. He also
indicated that although Shuwa understood the asbestos issue,
they were less concerned about it than most domestic bidders.
(26)
59
Shuwa agrees that it can move fast. In the U.S. the
approval of only three people decides whether the company
will pursue a given property: the project manager, the head
of acquisitions and the head of its U.S. operations, Takaji
Kobayashi. Of course, the final approval for any purchase
must come from Tokyo. However, this can also be done
quickly, for two reasons. First, Tokyo is kept abreast of
all U.S. real estate being considered for acquisition, and is
therefore already familiar with each property. Secondly,
Shuwa is not a public company, but rather is privately owned
by its president, Shigeru Kobayashi (father of Takaji
Kobayashi). As a result, it does not need to assemble and
convince a Board of Directors in order to make a decision.
In addition to speed, Shuwa feels that now, with its
experience in buying U.S. office buildings and with an
increase in its U.S. staff (including the hiring of several
Americans), it has improved its ability to analyze
properties, and to know what it will take to manage them once
they are acquired. The main criteria they use in evaluating
properties are: (1) location, (2) quality of the building and
(3) cap rate, which may vary depending on (1) and (2). Shuwa
does not speculate. It plans to own its properties for a
very long time and therefore is interested in security. It
requires a steady income and wants credit tenants. Often it
will obtain rental guarantees from a building's seller in
order to assure its cash flow for the first few years of its
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ownership.
The purchase of Arco Plaza accomplished another key
objective for the company. As previously mentioned, this
purchase was the largest in the history of Southern
California. With this one transaction, Shuwa "put (its) name
on the map" and established itself as a major force in
American real estate.
The publicity which accompanied this acquisition ensured
that Shuwa would become known to all the key players in U.S.
real estate. It generated important contacts throughout the
real estate community, so that now, Shuwa believes, it has
access to every major deal in this country. Currently, Shuwa
owns about $2 billion of property in the United States,
including three major office buildings in downtown Los
Angeles.
Unlike most other Japanese companies, however, it has
acquired properties not only in the CBD but also throughout
the Greater Los Angeles area. Exhibit 4-2 details all of
Shuwa's commercial holdings in this region.
The following chapter examines the observed differences
between these and other foreign investors and their domestic
counterparts.
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EXHIBIT 3-2
OFFICE PROPERTIES IN GREATER LOS ANGELES AREA OWNED
BY SHUWA CORPORATION
Property Name & Address
1. Atlantic Richfield Plaza
505, 555 South Flower St.
Downtown, Los Angeles, CA
2. Chase Plaza
801 South Grand Ave.
Downtown, Los Angeles, CA
3. 800 Figueroa Building
800 Figueroa St.
Downtown, Los Angeles, CA
4. 6222 Wilshire Building
6222 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA
5. 1900 Avenue of the Stars
Century City, Los Angeles, CA
6. 1901 Avenue of the Stars
Century City, Los Angeles, CA
7. Hughes Building
101 North Sepulveda Blvd.
El Segundo, CA
8. Anaheim Office Park Building
1200 North Magnolia Ave.
Anaheim, CA
9. Mitsubishi Electric Building
5757 Plaza Dr.
Cypress, CA
10. Bay Corporate Center
2000, 2080 Anaheim Blvd.
Anaheim, CA
Year
Built
Year
Acq' d
Total
Floor
Area
(Sq. Ft.)
1971 1986 4,679,304
1986 1986 748,485
1981 1986 215,618
1986 1987 161,187
1969 1986 1,045,024
1967 1986 911,704
1985 1986 454,368
1984 1984 21,069
1985 1985 306,333
1985 1987 128,635
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EXHIBIT 3-2 (Con't)
OFFICE PROPERTIES IN GREATER LOS ANGELES AREA OWNED
BY SHUWA CORPORATION
Property Name & Address
Year
Built
11. Downey Savings Building
3200 Bristle St.
Costa Mesa, CA
12. Ultimate Building
1063 McGaw Ave.
Irvine, Ca
13. Rolm Building
17781 Cowan Ave.
Irvine, CA
14. Fitch Building
17601 Fithc St.
Irvine, CA
15. Tacobell Building
17901 Von Karman Ave.
Irvine, CA
16. 19000 MacArthur Building
19000 MacArthur Blvd.
Irvine, CA
17. Doelz Building
9501 Jeronimo Rd.
Irvine, CA
18. Baldwin Industrial Park Office
13441 Dalewood St.
Baldwin Park, CA
Year
Acq'd
1979 1986
1986 1987
1982 1987
1981 1986
1986 1987
1982 1986
1985 1986
1981 1981
Total Floor Area for All Properties
Total
Floor
Area
(Sq. Ft.)
213,330
54768
63,514
41,091
277,588
334 , 883
91., 154
32,524
9,780,579
Source: "Faces of Shuwa', informational brochure of
Shuwa Corporation
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CHAPTER IV
INVESTMENT CRITERIA AND DIFFERENCES
Real estate in the U.S. is no more mysterious than in
foreign countries. Consequently, when foreigners evaluate
Los Angeles properties they use the same basic criteria as
domestic investors do and, like their American counterparts,
they have individual risk and diversification preferences.
Some, like Shuwa, have developed formal investment
requirements which are stringently adhered to, while others,
like Ohbayashi, in the words of one of its officers, do not
have "firm standards" and are "still in the trial and error
stage." However, in all instances the decision criteria would
include a building's location and quality, tenant mix and
quality, the expiration of leases, etc. A senior officer of
La Solana Corporation (U.S. subsidiary of Sumitomo Realty &
Development Co.) summarized that he, "like everyone else,"
simply looked for "the best building with the best location."
The real differences, then, lie not in the basic
criteria themselves but in how foreigners look at them. This
chapter will identify some of the observed differences
between foreign and domestic investors and attempt to put
them in proper perspective by examining why they occur.
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Strong downtown preference
It has been widely observed that foreign real estate
investment is concentrated in the downtown areas of large
U.S. cities. As newcomers to the Los Angeles market,
foreign investors naturally want to avoid any undue risk and
they perceive that downtown is the most stable real estate
location. They buy what they are most familiar with, and
that is the downtown. As one observer from James Felt Realty
commented about Japanese investors, "They are an urban people
who believe that the CBD will always be viable." (27)
The suburban development and living patterns in America,
and especially in the Los Angeles area, are not analogous to
foreigners' own experiences back home. In Japan, and even
Europe, land is much less plentiful and the highway systems
are far less extensive than in the U.S. In these places, it
is important to be in the city, and as close to downtown as
possible. Thus, there is a significant cultural difference
that takes time for foreigners to understand. Even after
foreign companies have operated in the U.S. for several years
and have gained an understanding of the market, it often
remains difficult to convince an executive committee back
home to approve investment decisions.
As investment opportunities within Los Angeles' CBD
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diminish, due to intense competition for the finite number of
existing properties, companies will be forced to consider
other, more suburban areas. As they become more experienced,
firms will also be more comfortable with this course of
action. An example of this, as was previously mentioned, is
that Mitsui Fudosan currently plans no further acquisitions
in the CBD and is now exploring opportunities throughout the
Greater Los Angeles area. The only alternative would be to
stop investing or to go to "second tier cities" in the U.S.,
which are far less familiar.
At least one Japanese investor sees some advantages to
moving to suburban markets. A spokesman for Haseko
(California) Inc. (subsidiary of Hasegawa Komuten Co., a
large Japanese contractor) cited the following benefits:
diminished competition for deals, minimum cap rates of 8.5%
and purchase prices approximately 0100 less per square foot
for first class office space. Others are less enthused.
Ohbayashi, for instance, is skeptical of higher cap rates in
markets that do not offer a broad cross-section of tenants.
Willingness to pay
For the last two years, Japanese companies have been by
far the most active, and most visible, foreign investors in
the Los Angeles real estate market. They have invested huge
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sums in first rate office properties which typically have
been less than 15 years old and more than 85% occupied, with
several long-term leases to large tenants. However, in many
cases they have been accused of overpaying for these
buildings, sometimes grossly so.
Many Japanese firms, especially those which are publicly
owned, see real estate as a vehicle for obtaining a steady
and reliable stream of income for an extended period of time.
Companies such as La Solana, Mitsui Fudosan and Nomura will
project cash flows for an office building over a period of 20
years or more when analyzing it for acquisition. In order to
ensure this income stream, they have often required that the
seller of property in Los Angeles guarantee the rent for the
first few years. The seller is generally willing to do this
because the Japanese buyer has paid a premium for the
project.
However, a record setting price does not necessarily
prove that a buyer paid too much. For instance, in early
1987, Chiyoda Trading of Tokyo purchased La Colonnade, a
three story, 30,000 square foot office building in Beverly
Hills, located at the corner of Santa Monica Blvd. and Camden
Drive. Chiyoda paid $16.5 million, or $550 per square foot,
for the property. However, the building's sole tenant was
Merrill Lynch, which had seven years remaining on its lease,
with two automatic 5% rent increases. Given the excellent
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location and a sole credit tenant, the buyer was happy to pay
a 7.5% cap rate for this building. The seller, incidentally,
was French Kier Development, a British firm.
It is important to remember too that real estate is not
a fungible commodity. Each property is unique and, in
effect, is sold at auction. Obviously, whoever buys at an
auction will always pay more than anyone else. Further, the
Japanese are buying high quality "signature" properties.
Because this is a thin market and such buildings do not turn
over very often, it is not unreasonable to expect that when
such a property is sold, it will set a record in terms of
sale price per square foot. Therefore, it should be no
surprise that Japanese firms are paying record prices for
signature properties. Further, they should not be considered
foolish for doing so, given that these properties will not be
on the market again for many years. As Dick Stanson, Sr.
Vice President for Landauer Associates in Los Angeles,
observed, "These buildings will not be back in the
marketplace during our lifetime." (28)
Simpler deals and offers
In almost every case during the past few years in the
CBD, foreigners have paid cash for the properties they
bought. This precluded the need for complicated formulas and
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deal structures. If the funds used were not all equity, then
the foreign buyer had at least arranged its financing
separately.
As was discussed in the preceding chapter, companies
like Hammerson can raise money rather easily through the
capital markets. Japanese companies as well, with their
strong banking relationships in Japan and the value of their
"hidden assets", have ready access to huge amounts of cash.
Shuwa and Nomura indicated that for their purchases of
Arco Plaza and Manulife Plaza, respectively, funds were
available, if borrowed in Japanese yen, at an annual interest
rate of about 3%. Because this money was to be invested in
U.S. real estate, however, the companies would have been
exposed to the risk of currency fluctuations. To avoid this
exposure, they decided to borrow from their Japanese banks in
U.S. dollars instead and are paying interst at a rate of
about 7%. These loans were easily arranged and, even at the
7% rate, are more favorable than domestic companies could
have obtained by borrowing from U.S. lenders.
Long term view
It is a cliche to say that foreign investors have a long
term view and will hold properties for many years. This, of
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course, is a generalization. The business of the investor
and the type of property play an important role in
determining whether this is true in a aiven instance. For
example, construction companies like Ohbayashi and Haseko
expect to sell any properties they own within ten years,
whereas a developer like Mitsui Fudosan will sell some
properties (industrial parks) but will keep others (office
buildings).
Nor are foreigners unique in expecting to hold
properties for many years. U.S. insurance companies and
pension plans are obvious examples of domestic investors
which also have long term attitudes towards real estate.
Certain cultural and attitudinal differences regarding
realty do exist, however. As discussed in Chapter I, the
relative scarcity of land in other countries, especially
Japan, causes foreigners to place a greater value on it, both
monetarily and psychologically, than most Americans do. The
Japanese also tend to eschew speculative investments and
therefore do not expect to turn a quick profit. In addition,
some investors view U.S. real estate as a safe haven for
capital. Therefore, if they already own valuable property in
the U.S. there is no incentive to sell, as the proceeds would
just be reinvested in other, perhaps riskier, property. They
prefer to leave their money invested where it already is.
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Relationship oriented
Japanese companies rely heavily on relationships when
conducting business in their home country. Such
relationships are directly between the principal parties of a
transaction and no middlemen are involved. As a result,
Japanese firms are usually not comfortable dealing with the
hordes of consultants, brokers, attorneys and other
intermediaries that are part of the U.S. real estate
industry.
The Japanese realize that, as newcomers to this market,
they need information. However, they currently lack
effective connections in the business community. Some
Japanese concerns have therefore formed alliances with large
American firms, such as Cushman & Wakefield's consulting/
joint venture agreement with Mitsubishi Trust. Others remain
unconvinced of the need for such an arrangement. La Solana,
for instance, does not hire consulting firms to analyze the
market. Instead they do their own analysis using data that
is readily available from area brokers. Mitsui Fudosan is
somewhere in between. Although they have no special
relationship with any intermediaries, they did have two
separate market studies prepared by outside consultants in
connection with their development of the Mitsui Tower
project.
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The Ego Factor
The quality of a project is important for more than just
financial reasons. Although none of the Japanese investors
we interviewed discussed the role that institutional ego
plays in the investment decision process, there is undeniable
competition among them to acquire the best location, and the
largest or most prestigious building. A Los Angeles
developer who is joint venturing a local project confided
that his Japanese partner wants to spend a considerable
amount of money for certain building design features which,
in his opinion, will not result in higher rents. He believes
they are willing to pay for "perceived prestige" just to
enhance their image within the Japanese business community.
An obvious example occurred in January, 1987, when Shuwa
ran full page advertisements in a number of business journals
and newspapers, including the Los Angeles Times and the New
York Times. Under the banner "A Landmark Year" Shuwa touted
its many 1986 acquisitions, including Arco Plaza in Los
Angeles and the ABC Building in New York. Thus, although the
ego value of a specific property cannot be measured, it does
exist.
Of course, egos are not unknown in American real estate
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either. However, they tend to appear in the actions of
developers, not in the newspaper ads of institutional
investors.
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CHAPTER V
TRENDS IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN LOS ANGELES
Based on our discussions with principals of Japanese and
U.S. firms and with other real estate professionals and
intermediaries, we have formed the following conclusions
regarding future trends in foreign investment in the Los
Angeles real estate market.
Portfolio Diversification
Geographic and property-type diversification will be
pursued by foreign investors so that portfolios do not become
too heavily concentrated in one market or property type.
Just like the Europeans and Canadians who preceded them, the
Japanese will begin to mitigate this risk through acquisition
of properties outside the CBD.
The finite number of premium office buildings and
comparitively low yields on major properties in the Los
Angeles CBD constrain further investment in this market.
According to Carl Muhlstein, Senior Vice President of Cushman
& Wakefield, "There are only 25 key buildings in downtown Los
Angeles whose location and other attributes qualify for
Japanese investment" (29). Similar limitations exist in
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other major coastal markets as well. A senior officer of
Haseko feels that "Deals are few and far between on the
coasts". These limitations led Cushman & Wakefield to
sponsor tours of major suburban markets, such as Orange
County, to acquaint Japanese investors with new market types.
Japanese investors will seek smaller, less expensive
properties in the Los Angeles sub-markets and Orange County.
However, they will not compromise their investment criteria
when acquiring or developing properties in these markets.
For example, Shuwa recently purchased the Irvine Commercial
Center for $10 million. This property was fully leased,
recently constructed and had superb highway access. While
dwarfed in terms of acquisition cost by many of Shuwa's other
properties, this purchase is evidence of Shuwa's willingness
to acquire quality suburban projects. We expect other
investors to follow Shuwa's lead, particularly when they
realize that they can achieve higher returns outside the CBD.
Due to limited opportunities in major downtown areas,
European firms became active in suburban and second-tier city
markets several years ago. They did not invest in such
markets, however, until they had studied them over a period
of years. The Japanese are adopting a similar approach.
This trend will accelerate as high net worth Japanese
individuals and corporations also become attracted to the
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U.S. market. These investors will pursue smaller but never
the less significant deals, typically under 025 million. Due
to the high cost of downtown property, these investors will
focus on areas outside of the traditional central business
district. They will be attracted to these markets by the
same factors that interest large institutional investors:
quality product, low entry cost and higher returns.
As opportunities for office acquisitions diminish within
the CBD, we expect Japanese investors to focus on different
kinds of property, e.g. shopping centers, industrial parks,
etc. Joint venture development agreements with domestic
partners will also be used until the Japanese become
comfortable with these property types. For example, La
Solana Corporation is currently undertaking a 160,000 square
foot mixed-use commercial project in Ontario, California with
an American partner.
One approach that the Japanese will adopt to mitigate
risk in new markets is convertible debt. This mechanism will
allow them to observe how a property performs over a period
of years before converting their position from debt to
equity. Dai Ichi Life Insurance Company recently commited to
loan $25 million in the form of a convertible mortgage for a
U.S. office development project.
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Capitalization Rates
Japanese investors are largely responsible for the lower
capitalization rates now common for investment grade
properties in Los Angeles. However, within recent months,
capitalization rates have edged up as the Japanese have
stopped paying premiums, although they still tend to pay
somewhat ahead of the market for signature properties.
We expect this trend to continue. The Japanese have
been here long enough to understand the market and they have
been criticized at home by the press and the government for
paying high acquisition prices. Also, higher yields are now
being sought because some of the institutions have begun to
syndicate their properties to smaller investors in Japan.
Proiect Development
Japanese real estate companies will continue their
steady evolution from acquisition of existing buildings to
project development. To mitigate development risk, these
firms will form joint ventures with American partners.
Mitsui is on the forefront of this trend. They currently
have two major commercial joint venture development projects
totaling in excess of 1.2 million square feet underway in
Manhatten and Downtown Los Angeles.
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More Japanese investors will seek the prestige and
higher returns associated with project development as they
acquire the experience needed to undertake this task.
Eventually, these companies will seek to develop projects on
their own.
Syndication
Both Mitsui Real Estate Sales and Haseko are reported to
have syndicated portions of their U.S. portfolios. Shuwa is
also rumored to be trying to sell a partial interest in its
Arco Plaza property to individual Japanese investors.
Many Japanese individuals are interested in investing in
U.S. real estate because they can obtain higher returns than
are available in Japan. However, the average person in Tokyo
has no knowledge of U.S. markets and lacks the funds and
management ability needed to acquire property themselves.
Thus, syndication of U.S. projects by Japanese institutions
is a natural response to this demand. One syndication
currently being marketed in Japan by three trust banks even
has an American company as one of its general partners. We
expect to see more syndication activity as the Japanese
become more experienced with this technique.
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Property Management
In general, previous foreign investors did not acquire a
sufficiently large portfolio of properties to cost-justify
the addition of property management functions to their
operations. The Japanese are different. Companies with
substantial portfolios will become actively involved in the
operation and leasing of their property.
An executive of Nomura Real Estate International
indicated that "We intend to manage our own property to save
on fees. Your fees are very expensive." In fact, certain
firms such as LaSolana, Mitsui and Shuwa, have already begun
property management operations. At this time, however, it is
too early to determine how well they will manage their
properties.
Adoption of American Practices
Over time it will become more difficult to
distinguish Japanese investors from domestic companies. Many
Japanese firms already have more than one office in the U.S.
These offices will be increasingly staffed with Americans to
take advantage of their knowledge of local market conditions
and government procedures and of their professional real
estate contacts. Further, American staffs will be vested
with increasing discretion to purchase and develop property.
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With greater experience, the time needed to make investment
decisions should also be shortened. However, U.S. operations
will continue to be closely managed by home-office personnel
temporarily stationed in the U.S.
Internationalization of the U.S. Real Estate Market
Like earlier hyperbolies which accompanied large
Canadian and Arab investments before them, grandiose
expectations regarding the eventual scope of Japanese
investment activity will probably be exaggerated. Rather,
the U.S. is participating in the evolution of an
international real estate market in which the Japanese are
presently the leading players.
The U.S. real estate market offers Japanese and other
foreign investors a wide array of investment options and
structures that is unmatched in its size, scope and openness
by any other market in the world. Fearful of economic or
political backlash, Japanese firms may try to diversify away
from U.S. investments, but the huge volume of funds they
have to invest will make it almost impossible for them to do
so. Due to the fundamental attractiveness of the U.S.
market, we expect that Japanese investment will continue to
grow for the foreseeable future.
Steady growth is anticipated for two reasons. First,
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Japanese investors will become even more widespread in the
U.S. market as scores of cash-rich industrial companies an:
high net worth individuals from Japan purchase U.S.
property. For example, New York City's Tower 49 was
purchased as a corporate investment by the world's largest
producer of corn syrup, Japan's Kato Kagaku Company, for
$303.5 million. As this type of Japanese investor moves more
agressively into the United States, they may create
additional opportunities for domestic advisors.
Secondly, heavily regulated Japanese pension funds and
trust banks may also receive permission from the MOF to
invest in U.S. property. According to Russell Linder,
Director of Bear Saint Properties in Washington, D.C., "there
is more than $100 billion in pension money in Japan, if just
1% of that comes here, thats $1 billion, which is enormous."
(30)
Our expectation for Japan's continued prominence in U.S.
real estate investment is based on certain assumptioms, i.e.
that the Japanese economy will not experience a significant
downturn, that Japanese farmland adjacent to urban centers
will remain unavailable for development and that U.S.
investments continue to provide superior yields. A change in
any one of these items could negatively impact Japanese
investment in the U.S. In addition, investment could
decrease if the MOF were to adopt more restrictive policies.
81
It is important to remember too that the Japanese are
used to constant appreciation in property value and near 100%
occupancy rates. These conditions are rare in U.S. markets.
It is impossible to know how the Japanese will react to a
downturn in the U.S. real estate market. Note however, that
European investors became more conservative and pulled back
from the U.S. marketplace after previously blue-chip
southwestern markets soured in the mid-1980's.
A change in American political and social attitudes
represents the greatest possible detriment to continued
investment activity by any foreign investor. Thusfar, real
estate investment by foreign investors has not captured
widespread public attention. We do not expect that it will.
After all, the most prominent foreign investors, the
Japanese, own less than one percent of the value of real
property in the U.S. (31). If a public outcry were to
develop, more foreign investors would enter into joint
ventures with American firms to mitigate potential criticism.
Foreign investment in the U.S. is not a fad. Today the
Japanese are the most prominent and consistent investors in
our marketplace. They will not disappear, but, in time their
rate of U.S. acquisitions may level-off. Indeed, there are
signs that the Japanese may only be the leading wave of
additional Pacific Rim investment. Behind them may follow
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other significant Asian investors from Hong Kong, Singapore
and South Korea. Astute intermediaries are already
cultivating relationships with this potential group of
foreign investors.
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